In this paper, inspired by the work of Megiddo on the formation of preferences and strategic analysis, we consider an early market model studied in the field of economic theory, in which each trader's utility may be influenced by the bundles of goods obtained by her social neighbors. The goal of this paper is to understand and characterize the impact of social influence on the complexity of computing and approximating market equilibria.
Introduction
In mathematical economics, the general equilibrium theory has laid the foundation for competitive pricing [1, 24] . This theory was based on the supply-equal-demand principle of Adam Smith and Léon Walras [26] . For pricing in an exchange economy, the demand of a trader is usually modeled by a utility function which assigns each bundle of goods a non-negative value. An equilibrium price then leads the system to an efficient allocation of goods among traders. The pioneering equilibrium theorem of Arrow and Debreu [1] asserts the existence of market equilibria for a very general model of exchange markets.
In the traditional exchange model [1, 24] , each trader's utility depends only on the bundle of goods she obtains after the exchange. However, this view of demand may have some limitationsmany people's interests and value may be influenced by their social interactions [20] . For example, the more friends with iPhones that one has, the cheaper potentially it is for one to talk to them using an iPhone (due to the in-network service), and hence having an iPhone may be more valuable. In the age of ubiquitous social networks, it might be desirable to model markets and exchanges where traders' valuation and utilities are influenced by what their social neighbors have.
In this paper, we consider a market model in which each trader's utility is potentially influenced by the bundles of goods possessed by her social neighbors. The mathematical properties of this market model and its extensions have been extensively studied in economic theory, for example by Föllmer [14] , Evstigneev and Takasar [13, 12] , and Horst and Scheinkman [16] . Formally, a market in this model is defined by traders' initial endowments of goods, a social network among traders, and traders' utility functions that capture their valuations under social influence. One can extend the equilibrium theorem of Arrow and Debreu to prove the existence of equilibria in this market model with social influence.
The goal of this paper is to understand and characterize the impact of social influence on the complexity of computing and approximating market equilibria. To this end, we focus on two concrete influence models based on the traditional linear utility functions (to be defined below). We present both complexity-theoretic and algorithmic results for approximating an equilibrium in the two settings. Our complexity results show that even a bounded-degree and planar social network can significantly increase the difficulty of equilibrium computation even in markets only a constant number of goods. (Recall that a market equilibrium in a conventional Arrow-Debrau exchange market with linear utilities can be computed in polynomial time by convex programming [11, 23] .) Our algorithmic results suggest that finding an approximate equilibrium in markets with hierarchical influence networks might be easier than that in markets with arbitrary neighborhood structures.
Our study of the market model with social influence is inspired by the work of Megiddo [22] on the formation of preferences and strategic analysis. In his work on game theory [22] , Megiddo argued that, in some situations, players have to start analyzing the game before they have formed their preferences over the outcomes of the game. However, strategic analysis naturally depends on preferences. He presented a generalization of Nash's equilibrium theorem to resolve this dilemma, proving that equilibrium strategies exist in his more general model of non-cooperative games.
When extending his view from game theory to mathematical economics, where traders' preferences are their utilities, traders have to start analyzing the market before they have completely formed their utilities, and their utility functions depend on what their social neighbors have. The extension of Arrow-Debreu's equilibrium theorem in the market model with social influence can be viewed as an analog of Megiddo's equilibrium theorem for games.
While our primary intended contribution is to understand the impact of social influence on the complexity of market equilibria, we also intend to challenge a common belief that the equilibria of markets with a constant number of goods are easy to compute or easy to approximate, due to the success in [7] and [9] . We refer to this belief as the myth of a constant number of goods. By demonstrating a simple market with a constant number of goods and a bounded-degree, planar influence graph whose equilibrium is PPAD-hard to approximate, we provide a natural counterexample to this belief. This example also helps to enhance our own appreciation of the results in [7, 9] .
We also made a few technical contributions in this paper. We consider two concrete influence functions based on the linear utility functions. In our linear influence model, we allow neighbors' possessions to influence the slopes of a trader's linear utility function. In our threshold influence model, we allow neighbors' possessions to influence the thresholds of a trader's additively separable and piecewise-linear utility function. For both models, we show that finding a approximate market equilibrium is PPAD-hard. In these proofs we introduce several schematic refinements to the work of Chen et al [3, 5] that computing an equilibrium in a market with additively separable, piecewiselinear and concave utilities is PPAD-hard. In particular, for the linear influence model we prove that even when there are only four goods and the influence network is a bounded-degree, planar graph, the equilibrium approximation problem is still PPAD-hard. Indeed both proofs work for the special case of Fisher's model [2, 5, 25] . We hope our PPAD-hardness constructions will help to resolve more complexity-theoretic questions concerning other exchange markets.
Algorithmically, we present a divide-&-conquer algorithm for computing an approximate equilibrium in an Arrow-Debreu market with a constant number of goods and whose influence network is hierarchical. Let m denote the number of traders. We show that if a market with a hierarchical influence network has a constant number of goods and has an equilibrium in which the magnitude of the price of every good is at least 1/m a for some constant a > 0, then a polynomially-precisedapproximate market equilibrium can be found in time m O(log m) . Hence, although our algorithm is relatively simple, it offers a contrasting example to our complexity results on markets with arbitrary influence networks. In that case, we show that it is PPAD-hard to compute a polynomially-precised approximate equilibrium, even though the market has only four goods and its influence graph is planar with a bounded degree, and all four prices are roughly 1/4 in any of its approximate equilibrium. In other words, equilibrium approximation in markets with hierarchical influence networks might be easier than that in markets with arbitrary influence networks.
We hope our work is a step towards characterizing the impact of social influence on the complexity of computing and approximating market equilibria.
The Model and Our Main Results
We let G = {G 1 , . . . , G h } denote a set of h divisible goods and T = {T 1 , . . . , T m } denote a set of m traders. For each trader T k , k ∈ [m], we use w k ∈ R h + to denote her initial endowment and x k ∈ R h + to denote her allocation after the exchange. We always assume that the total supply of each good
, the allocation variable of T k for G j or simply the G j -variable of T k . Each trader T k also has a utility function u k . In the classical Arrow-Debreu market model [1] , u k only depends on the allocation variables x k,j of T k and is a function from R h + to R + . In this paper we consider a more general market model with social influence. The major difference is that the utility function u k of T k depends on not only her own allocation x k but also the allocations of other traders in the market. In general, u k could be a function over all the allocation variables:
Market equilibria can be defined similarly for this model. For convenience, we follow the convention and use x −k to denote the m − 1 allocation vectors (x 1 , . . . , x k−1 , x k+1 , . . . , x m ).
Definition 1 (Equilibria in Markets with Social Influence). A market equilibrium in a market M with social influence is a price vector p ∈ R h
+ together with allocations x 1 , . . . ,
2. Every trader gets a budget-feasible and optimal bundle: for every T k ∈ T , we have
The mathematical properties of this model and its extensions have been extensively studied in economic theory. An equilibrium always exists under mild conditions. In particular, it always exists for the two classes of utility functions (to be defined in Section 2.2) considered in the paper. We state the existence theorem in Section 2.2 and include the proof in Appendix A for completeness.
Social Influence Graphs
Given a market M with social influence, we define its social influence graph G M as follows: The vertex set is T , the set of traders; there is a direct edge from T j to T k if and only if the utility u k of T k depends on (or is influenced by) at least one allocation variable of T j . We use N (T k ) to denote the set of predecessors of T k in G M . We call N (T k ) the influencing neighbors of trader T k .
In Section 3 and 4, we study the complexity of computing an approximate market equilibrium (see the definition below) in a market with various families of influence graphs. To make this search problem more concrete, we will focus on the following two types of utility functions.
Linear and Threshold Influence Utility Functions
Let M be a market and G M be its social influence graph. Consider trader T k ∈ T .
Definition 2 (Linear Influence Functions). We call the utility function u k (x k , x j : T j ∈ N (T k )) of trader T k a linear influence function if it has the following form:
where c k,i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [h] and f k,i is a linear form over the allocation variables {x j : T j ∈ N (T k )} with non-negative 1 weights.
Note that once {x j : T j ∈ N (T k )} are fixed, the utility function u k becomes a linear function.
Definition 3 (Threshold Influence Functions). We call the utility function
of T k a threshold influence function if it has the following form:
where
and f k,i is a linear form over the allocation variables {x j : T j ∈ N (T k )} with non-negative weights.
Note that once {x j : T j ∈ N (T k )} are fixed, u k becomes an additively separable and piecewise linear function:
For each i ∈ [h], either u k,i is a linear function with slope c k,i (when d k,i = 0); or u k,i is piecewiselinear and the slopes of the two segments are c k,i and c
Since scaling u k does not affect the preference of T k over different bundles, we always assume that the linear and threshold influence utility functions are normalized: All the parameters in (1) and (2) For these two classes of utility functions, a market equilibrium always exists under mild conditions. We include the proof of Theorem 1 below in Appendix A for completeness. The proof also implies that finding an approximate equilibrium (see the definition and discussion in Section 2.3) is in the class TFNP. We need the following definition.
Definition 4 (Nonsatiation). A function f over R ℓ
+ is said to be nonsatiated, if for all x ∈ R ℓ + , there exists an
. f is said to be nonsatiated with respect to the i th variable if for all x ∈ R ℓ + , there exists an
1 Of course in general the weights can be negative but then the sufficient conditions in Theorem 1 have to be changed accordingly. In this paper we only focus on the non-negative case. 
Definition 5 (Economy Graphs). Given a market M with social influence, we use H M to denote the following directed graph. The vertex set is T , the set of traders in M. For every two traders
T j , T k ∈ T ,
Approximation of Market Equilibria
In both our complexity-theoretic and algorithmic studies, we use the following notion of (weakly) approximate equilibria.
2. For every trader T k ∈ T , her budget is approximately feasible:
3. For every trader T k ∈ T , her allocation x k is approximately optimal: Given a market M with linear (or threshold) influence functions, find an ǫ-approximate market equilibrium with ǫ = 2 − max(h,m) .
The market is approximately cleared: For every good
In Section 3, we prove the following PPAD-hardness results.
1. In Section 3.2, we show that the problem of finding an m −16 -approximate equilibrium in a market with linear influence utilities is PPAD-hard, even when the market has only four goods and the social influence graph is bounded-degree and planar. This contrasts with the classical linear Arrow-Debreu model, for which efficient algorithms are known [11, 23, 7, 8, 17, 15, 18, 10, 27 ].
2. In Section 3.3, we show that when arbitrarily many goods are allowed, finding an m −11 -approximate equilibrium in a market with threshold influence utilities is PPAD-hard, even when the influence graph is bounded-degree and planar.
Both PPAD-hardness results actually hold for the special Fisher's market model. In Section 4, we show that if the social influence graph G M of M has a hierarchical structure (see definition in Section 4.2); and the number of goods in M is a constant; and M has a market equilibrium in which 1/p i is bounded above by m a for some constant a > 0 for all i ∈ [h], then a 1/poly(m)-approximate market equilibrium can be found in time m O(log(m)) .
Hardness of Markets with Social Influence

Two-Player Matrix Games and Their Nash Equilibria
A two-player game is defined by a pair of payoff matrices (A, B) of its two players. Here we assume both players have n choices of actions, so A and B are square matrices with n rows and columns.
(In this section, we will always use n to denote the size of A and B.) We let ∆ n ⊂ R n denote the set of probability distributions of n dimensions.
A pair of probability distributions (x, y), x, y ∈ ∆ n , is a Nash equilibrium of (A, B), if
where we let A i and B i denote the ith row vector of A and ith column vector of B, respectively.
Definition 7 (Well-Supported Nash Equilibria). For ǫ > 0, we say (x, y) is an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium of (A, B), if x, y ∈ ∆ n and for all i, j ∈ [n], we have Let Sparse-Nash denote the problem of finding an n −6 -well-supported Nash equilibrium in an n × n sparse and normalized two-player game, where each payoff entry is a rational number that is specified as the ratio of two integers. We will use the following hardness result:
Theorem 2 (Sparse Two-Player Nash [4] ). Sparse-Nash is PPAD-complete.
Markets with Linear Influence Utilities
Building on the scheme introduced in [3, 5] , we reduce Sparse-Nash to the following problem:
Planar-Linear-Market: The input is a market M = (G,
The output is then an m −16 -approximate market equilibrium, where m = |T |.
Theorem 3 (Main)
. Planar-Linear-Market is PPAD-hard.
The Construction
Let (A, B) be an n × n normalized and sparse two-player game. We first construct from (A, B), in polynomial time, a market M with only two goods and linear influence utilities, such that every 1/n 15 -approximate market equilibrium of M gives us a 1/n 6 -well-supported Nash equilibrium of (A, B). However, its influence graph G M might not be planar. In Section 3.2.3, we show how to revise the construction so that the influence graph is planar.
Let α = 1/n 3 , β = 1/n 10 and γ = 1/n 4 . The market M consists of the following traders:
They have the following initial endowments: (1) the initial endowment of T is (1, 1), one unit of each good; and (2) the initial endowment of any other trader is (α, α). As a result, the total supply of each good is 1 + O(1/n).
Remark 2. The market constructed here is in fact a Fisher market (with social influence).
Utility Function of T :
The utility of T only depends on her own allocation. We set the slopes of both goods to be 1.
Other than her own allocation, the utility function of X i also depends on that of A i,1 . For convenience we use a i,1 to denote the G 1 -allocation variable of A i,1 . Then we set the parameters of X i 's utilities appropriately so that the slope of good G 1 is 1 + γ and the slope of good G 2 is 1 + a i,1 . As it will become clear later, the G 1 -allocation variables of X i , i ∈ [n], denoted by x i , will be used to encode the probability distribution of the first player in the two-player game (A, B).
Other than her own allocation, the utility of Y i only depends on that of B i,1 . We let b i,1 denote the G 1 -allocation variable of B i,1 . Then we set the parameters of Y i 's utilities appropriately so that the slope of good G 1 is 1 + γ and the slope of good G 2 is 1 + b i,1 .
As it will become clear later, the G 1 -allocation variables of Y i , i ∈ [n], denoted by y i , will be used to encode the probability distribution of the second player in the two-player game (A, B).
Utility Functions of
The role of U i,j is to enforce the following Nash equilibrium constraint:
where, as mentioned above, we use x i to denote the G 1 -allocation variable of X i and y i to denote the G 1 -allocation variable of Y i .
To this end, we let
Hence we have 0
The utility function of U i,j depends on y ℓ , the G 1 -allocation variable of Y ℓ with
Since A is a sparse matrix, there can be at most 20 such ℓ's. We set the parameters of U i,j 's utility appropriately so that the slopes of the two goods are
respectively. Similarly the role of V i,j is to enforce the following constraint:
Her utility is similar to that of U i,j except that it depends on x ℓ , the G 1 -allocation variable of X ℓ with B ℓ,i − B ℓ,j = 0. We omit the details here.
The role of the traders A i,k , k ∈ [n − 2], is the following. Let a i,j denote the G 1 -allocation variable of A i,j , and u i,j denote the G 1 -allocation variable of U i,j . Then we need to set the utilities of A i,1 , . . . , A i,n−2 appropriately so that in every approximate market equilibrium, we have ∃ j : u i,j is large =⇒ a i,1 is large and ∀ j : u i,j is close to 0 =⇒ a i,1 is close to 0, while keeping the degree of the influence graph small. In particular, the utility of A i,k only depends on two other traders.
To this end, we set the utilities as follows. Here we take i = 1 as an example. The general case can be done similarly. If k = n − 2, then the utility of A 1,k depends on both U 1,n−1 and U 1,n . We set the slopes of her utility function to be 1 + u 1,n−1 + u 1,n and 1 + γ.
For each k < n − 1, the utility of A i,k depends on both A 1,k+1 and U 1,k+1 . We set the slopes of her utility function to be 1 + a 1,k+1 + u 1,k+1 and 1 + γ.
The utilities of B i,k 's, k ∈ [n − 2], are set similarly, and we omit the details here.
Correctness of the Reduction
It is easy to check that the market constructed satisfies all the conditions of Theorem 1, and the degree of its influence graph is bounded by 20 (though may not be planar yet). Now suppose we have an ǫ-approximate equilibrium where ǫ = 1/n 15 (in which the sum of the prices p 1 + p 2 is equal to 1).
First we show that p 1 and p 2 must be very close to 1/2.
Lemma 1.
In every ǫ-approximate equilibrium, p 1 , p 2 ∈ [1/2 − λ, 1/2 + λ] with λ = 1/n 14 .
Proof. Suppose this is not the case and without loss of generality, p 1 < 1/2 − λ and p 2 > 1/2 + λ. First the budget of T is 1 since her initial endowment is (1, 1). Also it is clear that the optimal bundle for her is (1/p 1 , 0) with utility 1/p 1 . Let (t 1 , t 2 ) be the allocation of T in the ǫ-approximate equilibrium, then by definition (conditions 2 and 3) we have
It then follows that
However, the total budget of all other traders in the market is
As a result, even if they spend all the money on G 2 , they can consume at most
of G 2 and the total consumption of G 2 is O(1/n). This contradicts with the assumption since the total supply of G 2 is 1 + Θ(1/n).
Next, we let x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) denote the vector in which x i is the G 1 -allocation variable of X i ; and y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) denote the vector in which y i is the G 1 -allocation variable of Y i , i ∈ [n]. We show that after rounding:
and y
and normalization:
the pair of distributions (x * , y * ) must be a 1/n 6 -well-supported Nash equilibrium of (A, B). To this end, we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2. Let k ∈ [n] be any index that maximizes
be any index that maximizes xB k , then we must have y k = Ω(1/n 3 ).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume A 1 y T = max k A k y T . Now we examine traders U 1,j , j ∈ [2 : n]. For each j ∈ [2 : n], by the construction, the slopes of the two goods G 1 , G 2 of U 1,j are 1 + Dy
respectively, where
Since the budget of U 1,j is α, her optimal bundle is (0, α/p 2 ) with utility α(1 + β + Cy T )/p 2 . Let (s 1 , s 2 ) denote the allocation of U 1,j in the approximate equilibrium, then by definition we have
Similarly it can be shown by induction that for every trader for the two goods, respectively. Using the same argument, it is easy to show that
The second part for y can be proved similarly.
Lemma 3. For all i = j ∈ [n], we have
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume (A 1 − A j )y T < −4/n 10 for some j = 1. First of all, the slopes of trader U 1,j are 1 + Dy T and 1 + 1/n 10 + Cy T ,
respectively. Since (C − D)y T = (A 1 − A j )y T /2 < −2/n 10 , her optimal bundle is (α/p 1 , 0) with utility α(1 + Dy T )/p 1 . It is then easy to show that in an ǫ-approximate equilibrium her allocation of G 1 must satisfy u 1,j = Ω(1/n 3 ). Next one can show that, by induction, all traders A 1,1 , . . . , A 1,j−1 like G 1 much better than G 2 and in any ǫ-approximate market equilibrium, we have a 1,1 = Ω(1/n 3 ). As a result, trader X 1 likes G 2 much better than G 1 and it can be shown that
By combining the two lemmas above, it is easy to show that (x * , y * ) is a 1/n 6 -well-supported Nash equilibrium of (A, B), proving the correctness of the reduction.
Reduction to Markets with Planar Influence Graphs
We next show that the hardness result remains to hold even if the influence graph is planar. Let (A, B) be a sparse two-player game and M be the market constructed above. We set α = 1/n 9 , β = 1/n 16 , and γ = 1/n 10 .
We also add two new goods to the market M so that there are totally four goods G 1 , G 2 , G 3 , G 4 . We change the initial endowments and utilities of the traders in M as follows:
1. The initial endowment of T is now (1, 1, 1, 1) (and thus, her budget is still 1);
2. The initial endowment of any other trader in M is (α, α, α, α) (and thus, her budget is α);
3. The utility function of T now has slope 1 for all of the four goods; and the utility of any other trader remains unchanged (so they are only interested in goods G 1 and G 2 ).
Let G M be the influence graph of M. We first compute (in polynomial time) a planar embedding of the directed graph G M so that no three directed edges intersect at the same point. Let S denote the set of all intersections in this planar embedding. We then add a new trader for each intersection S ∈ S and call her trader S. For each direct edge
. . , S ℓ T j be the segments along T i T j in the embedding, we add a new trader for each segment S k S k+1 , k ∈ [ℓ − 1], and for S ℓ T j . We call them trader S k S k+1 and trader S ℓ T j , respectively, for convenience. The total number of traders is bounded by O(n 8 ) since there are only O(n 2 ) traders in M. All the new traders have the same initial endowment (α, α, α, α) (and thus, all of them have budget α). Let ǫ = 1/n 32 . Then given any ǫ-approximate equilibrium of this new market (even though we have not set the utilities of the new traders yet), we can show the following lemma concerning the price vector p (with i∈ [4] p i = 1). The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1 so we omit it here.
Lemma 4. In any ǫ-approximate equilibrium, p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 ∈ [1/4 − λ, 1/4 + λ] where λ = 1/n 31 .
Next we set the utilities of the new traders appropriately so that along each directed edge T i T j of G M with segments T i S 1 , S 1 S 2 , . . . , S ℓ T j , the G 1 -allocation variable of T i is "almost faithfully" copied along the edge, by the G 1 -allocation variables of traders S 1 S 2 , . . . , S ℓ−1 S ℓ and S ℓ T j finally. As a result, we are able to use the G 1 -allocation variable of S ℓ T j , instead of that of T i , to influence the utility of T j , by replacing the G 1 -variable of T i in the utility function of T j with the G 1 -variable of S ℓ T j . The goal is to preserve the original reduction while making the influence graph of the new market planar. To this end, we set the utilities of the new traders as follows.
Let S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 and S be five intersection points in S such that S 1 S, SS 2 are on the same edge of G M and S 3 S, SS 4 are on the same edge of G M . For convenience, we also use s 1,i , s 2,i , s 3,i and s 4,i to denote the G i -variable of traders S 1 S, SS 2 , S 3 S and SS 4 , respectively, and s i to denote the G i -variable of S. We set the utility functions of S, S 3 and S 4 as follows so that in any ǫ-approximate market equilibrium, s 2,1 is very close to s 1,1 and s 4,1 is very close to s 3,1 .
1. The utility of S depends on all traders S 1 S, SS 2 , S 3 S and SS 4 . The slopes of the goods are:
2. The utility of SS 2 only depends on S. The slopes of the four goods are:
1 + s 1 , 1 + s 2 , 0 and 0. This completes the construction. With Lemma 5, one can prove new versions of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. Using the fact that there more than n 2 traders in the market, Theorem 3 then follows.
Markets with Threshold Influence Utilities
In this section, we reduce Sparse-Nash to the following market equilibrium problem:
Planar-Threshold-Market: The input is a market M = (G, T , w i , u i ) satisfying all conditions of Theorem 1, in which every utility is a normalized threshold influence function and the influence graph G M is planar and has constant degree. The output is an m −11 -approximate market equilibrium, where m = |T |.
be very close to (1/n 4 )e i and thus, the utility function of T * is very close to that of T in M. As a result, the preferences of the traders T * in M * are very similar to those of traders T in M. One can then follow the proof of [3] closely to show that, given any n −22 -(weakly)-approximate equilibrium of M * , an n −6 -well-supported Nash equilibrium of (A, B) can be computed in polynomial time. Theorem 4 then follows from the fact that m = Θ(n 2 ).
Algorithm for Markets with Hierarchical Influence Graphs
In this section, we consider the special case when the market M has only a constant number of goods and the underlying influence graph is hierarchical. The utility of every trader in M is either a linear influence function or a threshold influence function, and the market satisfies all conditions of Theorem 1. We use h = |G| to denote the number of goods, which is a constant, and use m = |T | to denote the number of traders. Then we show that Notice that even for markets with a constant-degree and planar influence graph, this problem (with the guarantee that M has an equilibrium in which none of the prices is negligible) is PPADhard, as implied by the polynomial-time reduction presented in Section 3.2 (since we know all the four prices must be 1/4 in any equilibrium).
Existence of Approximate Equilibria with Discrete Prices
Let M be a market with (normalized) linear and threshold utility functions. For convenience, we assume the total supply of each good is exactly 1.
We assume M has an equilibrium (p * , x * 1 , . . . , x * m ) with p * i > 1/m a for some constant a > 0. Let ǫ = 1/m b for some constant b > 0. Then we can round the equilibrium (p * , x * 1 , . . . , x * m ):
to get a new tuple (p, x 1 , . . . , x m ) in which every entry is a multiple of 1/N . Using the definition, it can be checked that (p, x 1 , . . . , x m ) must be an ǫ-approximate market equilibrium 2 of M with
For convenience, we say a vector is discrete if all of its entries are multiples of 1/N . As a consequence, to find an ǫ-approximate equilibrium of M, we only need to enumerate all discrete price vectors p that satisfy (4) . For each vector p we check whether there exists a discrete tuple (x 1 , . . . , x m ), satisfying (4), such that (p, x 1 , . . . , x m ) is an ǫ-approximate equilibrium of M.
Notably there are only polynomially many vectors p to check, when h is a constant. Next we show for every p, the checking can be done in time m O(log m) for trees and hierarchical influence graphs. Theorem 5 then follows.
Trees and Hierarchical Influence Graphs
Let p be any discrete price vector that satisfies (4) .
We start with the simplest case when the influence graph G M is a complete binary tree. Every node v in the tree is a trader, and every edge is bidirectional (and thus, the influence between two connected traders is also bidirectional). Due to the tree structure, every trader v can influence (at most) three traders in the market. We use w v to denote the initial endowment of v, with budget
To verify whether p is an ǫ-approximate market equilibrium price vector, we use the following top-down and divide-and-conquer algorithm Check-Tree(T , x, y):
1. T is a complete binary tree with r as its root; and 2. Both x and y are h-dimensional discrete vectors.
The algorithm then returns a collection of vector {x v : v ∈ T } such that
1. x r = x and v∈T x v = y; and 2. For every v ∈ T (including r), x v is an ǫ-approximately feasible and ǫ-approximately optimal bundle for v with respect to p and her neighbors' allocations, if such a tuple exists; and the algorithm returns 'nil' otherwise. To verify whether p is an ǫ-approximate equilibrium price, we only need to call the Check-Tree with T being the whole binary tree, and x, y being all possible discrete vectors satisfying (4). This gives us an algorithm with time complexity (2N ) 2h times the complexity of Check-Tree.
Check-Tree runs recursively as follows:
1. The case when T is a single node is trivial: One simply checks whether x = y and x is also approximately budget-feasible and approximately optimal for the trader.
2. Otherwise, let r be the root of T and let T 1 and T 2 be the two subtrees of r. We then enumerate all possibilities of x 1 for the root of T 1 , denoted by r 1 ; x 2 for the root of T 2 , denoted by r 2 ; y 1 for T 1 as the total consumption of T 1 ; and y 2 as the total consumption of T 2 , such that (a) x r = x and x r + y 1 + y 2 = y;
(b) x r = x is approximately feasible and optimal for r, given p as the price vector and x 1 and x 2 as the allocations of r 1 and r 2 , respectively.
For any combination of (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ) that satisfies the conditions above, we modify the utility of r 1 and r 2 by replacing the allocation variables of r, in the utility functions of r 1 and r 2 , with x r . Then we recursively call Check-Tree(T 1 , x 1 , y 1 ) and Check-Tree(T 2 , x 2 , y 2 ). If neither call returns 'nil', we concatenate the outputs with x r and output.
If we use ℓ, the depth of the tree, to measure the time complexity TIME(h) of Check-Tree, then
Thus, TIME(ℓ) = N O(ℓ) and hence the running time of Check-Tree measured using m, the number of traders in the market, is m O(log m) . Clearly this divide-and-conquer approach can be applied to any market with a constant-degree tree influence graph. More generally, it can be applied to the following family of graphs which we call hierarchical graphs: When k and the degree of the underlying tree are constant, the divide-and-conquer approach also yields an algorithm for finding a 1/poly(m)-approximate market equilibrium with time complexity m O(log m) , when the market has an equilibrium in which the price of each good is bounded below by 1/n a , for some constant a.
Then we show that x i > c for all i ∈ [h]. We need the following lemma: Lemma 7. Let (x 1 , . . . , x m , p) be any fixed point of φ. Let T k ∈ T be a trader with budget w = w k · p > 0 and her function u k is nonsatiated with respected to G i ∈ G. Then we must have
Proof. Assume for contradiction that p i < w/2 2L . By the assumption, we have c k,i ≥ 2 −L (and c k,i − d k,i ≥ 2 −L , for threshold influence functions), and the bang-per-buck of G i is at least
On the other hand, the slope of any good G j in the market is c k,j + f k,j ≤ 1 + mh.
Now let S ⊆ [h] be the set of index j such that
For every j ∈ S, the bang-per-buck of G j is at most
and is strictly smaller than that of G i . Therefore, by the optimality of x k , we have x k,j = 0 for all j ∈ S unless x i = 1.1. However, by Lemma 6 we have x i < 1.1 and thus, x k,j = 0 for all j ∈ S. We then get a contradiction since the total cost of the bundle is j / ∈S x k,j · p j < 1.1
and thus, x k is not optimal. Proof. Assume for contradiction that p 1 = c. Then by condition 3 of Theorem 1, we assume that the utility function u k of T k is nonsatiated with respect to G 1 . As the total budget of all the m traders is 1, there must be a trader T k ′ ∈ T whose budget is w k ′ · p ≥ 1/m. Moreover, since the economy graph H M is strongly connected, there is a sequence of at most m traders: T k ′ = T i 0 , T i 1 , . . . , T i,ℓ−1 , T i,ℓ = T k such that there is an edge from T i s+1 to T is for all s : 0 ≤ s ≤ ℓ − 1.
We then prove the following bound on the budget of T is by induction on s:
the budget of T is ≥ 1 m · 2 3sL , for all s : 0 ≤ s ≤ ℓ.
The base when s = 0 is trivial. Assume (5) is true for s ≥ 0. Because there is an edge from T i s+1 to T is , there exists a good G j such that w i s+1 ,j > 0 (and thus, > 2 −L by assumption) and u is is nonsatiated with respect to G j . Since the budget of T is is at least 1/(m · 2 3sL ), by Lemma 7
As a result, the budget of T i s+1 is at least
This finishes the induction.
As a result, the budget of T k = T i,ℓ is at least To finish the proof, we show that they must all equal to 1. To this end, if x 1 > 1 then we have k∈ [m] x k · p = x · p > i∈ [h] p i = 1 = k∈ [m] w k · p, which contradicts the assumption that every x k is budget-feasible. And if x 1 < 1, then
As a result, one of the traders T k did not exhaust her budget. By the concavity and nonsatiation of u k , this contradicts with the optimality of x k .
